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A B S T R A C T
Efforts at urban e-mobility transition in China are of crucial global significance. Exploring these developments,
however, demands significant reframing of dominant theories of socio-technical system transition to accom-
modate the strikingly different socio-political context of China to that of the global North where these theories
have been developed. In particular, greater attention must be paid to issues of power, conceptualized as dynamic
power/knowledge relations constitutive of social formations and evolving in interactive parallel with specific
innovation trajectories. We illustrate such a productive reframing focusing on complex processes of empower-
ment and highlight that there remains relative stasis in the grand plan of a rapid transition to electric cars (EVs)
in China's growing cities, with the EV still widely regarded as “risky” mobility. At the same time the EV in China
is becoming a constituent of a new kind of digitized and smart mobility, as Chinese ICT companies emerge as
globally powerful players establishing alliances with traditional automobile companies.
1. Introduction
Transportation accounts for approximately one quarter of global
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) (IEA, 2015) and is key to efforts to
mitigate climate change. Multiple transitions around the world are
necessary to sustainable development (Kemp et al., 2007; Rock et al.,
2009). While there is embryonic evidence of ‘peak car’ in the ‘global
North’, especially amongst younger people (Cohen, 2012; Lyons and
Goodwin, 2014), mobility-related emissions are rising fast in populous
countries like China and India (Schwanen et al., 2011). These trends are
particularly striking in China, rendering it globally central to
low‑carbon mobility transition.
Cars in China increased more than six times between 2002 and 2013
to 137 million (OICA, 2013). The ‘car-ing’ of Chinese society constructs
China as a test-case in the challenges of decarbonizing urban mobility
that face established ‘car’ societies in the global North, not just those of
rapidly developing countries. Yet decarbonizing the currently car-based
urban mobility is not merely pressing but is also a ‘wicked’ set of in-
tractable, huge and system problems (Marletto, 2014).
The dominant policy narrative in China today, dominating plans for
future city mobility at all tiers of government, focuses on decarbonising
car transport through electrification, specifically in the form of a Chinese
system of New Energy Vehicles (usually treated synonymously with
electric vehicles, ‘EVs’, specifically electric cars) (Teng et al., 2015). The
EV thus represents a necessary starting point for analysis of current
low‑carbon mobility innovation in China.
Yet how are we to understand and/or expedite and shape urban e-
mobility transition in China? This paper argues that literatures and
theories dominating study of low‑carbon system transition to date, and
emergent from research focusing on case studies in the Global North,
struggle with illuminating the radically different context – socio-
political, economic and cultural – of China. Conversely, revisiting and
developing a perspective on socio-technical system transition through
reflection on the Chinese case presents a new power relational per-
spective that promises not only to illuminate this crucial global case
more fully, but also to motivate a broader reframing of such work.
Accordingly, our aims in this paper are two-fold: to present and de-
monstrate this power relational perspective at work in insightful ana-
lysis of the case of Chinese urban e-mobility innovation; and to high-
light the theoretical insights regarding how this perspective is of
broader relevance to addressing some of the persistent criticisms of
systems transitions literature.
Central to this argument is that the issue of power has not been
adequately integrated into the socio-technical analysis of sustainability
transitions, yet is key to understand the transition to sustainable urban
mobility, especially in China. We demonstrate the importance of ana-
lysis of innovation initiatives that focuses directly on the interplay be-
tween novel socio-technical interventions and existing relations of
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power/knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2004).
In particular, we show how shifting to a power relational perspec-
tive both broadens the relevant sociotechnical system under analysis
from that of the (electric) ‘car’ to dynamic and emerging systems of
mobility; and presents evidence, which is otherwise overlooked, of
considerable system dynamism (section 5), challenging the stasis of
continued techno-economic lock-in and innovation weakness (section
4). Finally, returning to the significance of our findings we highlight
that the key future challenges for e-mobility transition in China are
likely to become increasingly political and cultural; the dimensions that
the socio-technical systems literature has tended, to date, to downplay.
First, however, we explore the specific challenges China poses to ex-
isting Western-formulated theories of socio-technical system transition
and articulate the necessity of a different approach to these questions
that grapples directly with dynamic systems of power/knowledge re-
lations.
2. Theoretical and conceptual issues: low-carbon transition in
China as power transition
There is a distinct body of literature that focuses on transitions to-
wards more sustainable socio-technical systems and which considers
the dynamics of sustainable technological change in some depth (Smith
and Stirling, 2008). This includes a socio-technical approach, along
with the complex systems view and governance perspectives that were
nurtured by the Dutch Knowledge Network on System Innovation and
Transitions (Grin et al., 2010). The socio-technical transition perspec-
tive situates technologies in the contexts that enable them to work
(ibid.) and focuses not only on artefacts (technologies) but the struc-
tures, agents and processes that reproduce a ‘socio-technical practice’
(Rip and Kemp, 1998).
The lack of attention to power and politics in transition studies has
recently emerged as an important point of critique on early transition
research (Avelino and Grin, 2016). There has been ongoing debate on
the questions of agency, power struggle and politics in some of the
theories of middle range, such as the multi-level perspective (MLP)
(Kern, 2011; Kern et al., 2014; Lockwood, 2013; Smith et al., 2014).
The MLP perspective, a heuristic which aims at explaining the process
of substitution of a technological paradigm as new ‘niches’ of innova-
tion grow to the point of discontinuity at system level, has been criti-
cized for underplaying the role of agency – and cognate concepts such
as politics, power, practices and daily habits, and culture – in transi-
tions (Genus and Coles, 2008; Meadowcroft, 2009; Shove and Walker,
2007; Smith et al., 2010). Conversely, proponents have argued that the
perspective accommodates issues of agency but has not developed
analysis of some particular types of agency (Geels, 2011).
Nonetheless, responding to such criticisms there have been nu-
merous attempts to include various types of agency and incorporate
insights on power from political science (Grin et al., 2010), social
movement studies (Elzen et al., 2011) and by developing a cultural
dimension (Geels, 2014; Geels and Verhees, 2011). Grin et al. (2010)
have developed a governance approach that aims to address the pivotal
issue of agency, shedding light on its distributed nature and the mul-
tiplicity of agents that exert influence on a transition (Grin et al., 2011).
The questions of strategic agency and ability of competent agents to
connect are crucial in understanding the interactional dynamics be-
tween four institutions of market, government, science and technology
and the outcomes. This perspective in understanding the politics of
transition emphasizes that the regime embodies power and some of the
practices of the regime will be preferred over the others. Hence the
incumbent regime generates resistance to new, rising niches, including
through the significant effects of its dominant discourses on struggles
for legitimacy of the new innovations (Grin et al., 2011).
Other studies emergent from this tradition conceptualize power
within a complex systems approach (Avelino and Rotmans, 2009;
Rotmans and Loorbach, 2010). Avelino and Rotmans propose an
interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural
change. In particular, they address the issue of “innovative power” as a
“capacity of actors to create or discover new resources” (Avelino and
Rotmans, 2009: 552) and stress the need to address empirically the
exercise of innovative power in a micro-level, local context.
While taking seriously the neglect of the role of power in transition
studies, however, these studies have continued to focus over-
whelmingly on corporate, manufacturing and policy actors, leaving out
the user or demand side (Shove, 2003; Spaargaren, 2003). At the same
time many studies of politics in sustainability transitions draw on case
studies in north and western Europe and have limited applicability to
other geographic cases, including the majority world or potentially
globally-significant ones, such as China. For instance, important studies
of coalition politics (in the US - Hess, 2014) and advocacy coalitions (in
Switzerland - Markard et al., 2016) have highlighted the need to con-
sider the political circumstances that make adoption of policies possible
or likely, yet these contexts are significantly different in China to
western Europe.
Of perhaps greatest importance, however, is how even the most
sophisticated literature (Geels, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Van Bree et al.,
2010) – while going beyond the persistent and inadequate techno-
centric policy orthodoxy that characterizes policy in China – continues
to deal insufficiently with the central role of power in the construction,
constitution, shaping, and driving of such low‑carbon transitions (Tyfield
et al., 2015). To stress, therefore, the primary shortcoming of this lit-
erature is not that it must, nor even that it does, neglect issues of power,
politics and culture, but that it continues to conceptualize these key
dimensions – constrained by its ready-made multi-level framework – in
ways that are unable properly to accommodate them.
Symptomatically, most studies thus focus on issues of power in
terms of their ongoing difficulties as system “lock-in” (Geels, 2014;
Marletto, 2014; Cf Unruh, 2000), rather than offering ways of pro-
ductively conceptualizing possible discontinuities and ‘break-out’.
‘Power’ is thus understood as a purely negative consideration, frus-
trating transitions that are understood to be desirable ex ante (on the
normative dimension of MLP studies, see Smith et al., 2010), and often
framed in thin, binary terms of ‘good, ‘green’ innovation constrained by
‘bad’, ‘high‑carbon’ socio-technical regimes.
This approach, thus, not only sets a research agenda over-
whelmingly focused on the quantitative challenge of maximally ex-
pediting low‑carbon transition, to the relative exclusion of the all-im-
portant and omnipresent qualitative and sociological considerations of
which transition, benefitting whom and where. By conceptualizing
power as that which is held by incumbent regime actors (perhaps ‘over’
weaker niche actors), it also presents an analytical framework in which
regimes are dynamically locked-in almost by definition. The role of
power analysis in this case, then, is to explicate the networks and in-
teractions of the incumbently empowered, thereby explaining the on-
going tribulations of various desired low‑carbon niches in effecting the
discontinuity at regime level. This approach thus tends to privilege a
certain resignation regarding the persistent intransigence of ‘power’ to
resist socio-technical system change, together with an empirical gaze
firmly directed to these constraints. And, conversely, it legitimates a
particular Western political common-sense in which the apparent so-
lution to this problem is explicit political resistance and/or social
movement-building of various sorts.
Conversely, we elaborate the centrality of the political dimension in
sociotechnical transition by proposing that politics and power relations
cannot be something that is a mere sociocultural ‘context’ for innova-
tion, nor something that enters the analytical gaze at a later stage. In
placing politics as central, we are thus concerned more broadly with the
transformation and (re-)constitution of and by power – or, on this
conceptualisation, power/knowledge relations (Foucault, 2010; Dean,
2010; see Tyfield et al., 2015), so that power and knowledge are treated
as two sides of the same coin –, as evidenced in the transformations and
reconstitution of nexuses of social practices (McMeekin and Southerton,
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2012; Reckwitz, 2002; Shove et al., 2012) and associated group
boundaries (Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010) that constitute a given social
formation as complex systems of knowledge and power relations
(Tyfield, 2017).
We thus study the empowering, and not just the shielding and/or
nurturing, of specific ‘niches’ of innovation (Smith and Raven, 2012)
where these are taken as significant sites in which power relations are
being actively remade, possibly with wider social implications. ‘Power’
(/knowledge relations) and ‘politics’ are not, therefore, simply syno-
nyms for normatively problematic domination, to be contrasted with
rational and participatory argument; nor with the normatively lauded
arena of participation and contestation. Rather power is irreducible,
ubiquitous and essential for the actual constitution of socio-technical
transitions; and, as such, potentially (but not necessarily) problematic
and in need of being held to account and actively shaped.
From this perspective, low‑carbon innovations can be understood as
driving a broader shift at the ‘level’ of socio-technical regimes only to
the extent that new constellations of agents, institutions and artefacts
are enabled, while other groups are disabled. This enabling takes the
form of the strategic alignment of that ‘regime’ (and even ‘landscape’, in
the terminology of MLP) with pursuit of their specific interests and
projects, and vice versa, generating positive feedback loops of emer-
gent, self-sustaining ‘power momentum’ (see Fig. 1). And in both cases
these are manifest through changing social practices, and the social
identities and lived norms that accompany these.
Hence, once low‑carbon transition is conceptualized as itself a power
transition, this entails researching the changing power-knowledge re-
lations associated with – conditioning and affected by – such
low‑carbon innovation, in multiple forms, sites and scales (Tyfield
et al., 2015). This especially includes not just the official and informal
structures of state policy-making, but also new user1 collective iden-
tities, cultural phenomena and patterns of social stratification, as well
as changing forms of the corporation that emerge in parallel with such
innovations – all understood here as technologies and relations of
power/knowledge (Tyfield, 2017).
Moreover, this theoretical reframing is particularly promising be-
cause it offers a more insightful and strategically energizing analysis
regarding the case of China. Conceptualizing power as constitutive but
ambivalent, and inseparable from socio-technical change, it affords
analysis in geographical contexts with very different political systems
and definitions of ‘politics’ to that presumed by MLP work. For instance,
one of the characteristic elements of power relations in China is (inter-
personal) “relational power” in terms of the ties of mutual dependence
(Chong et al., 2013) and guanxi (“connections”), both important aspect
of Chinese culture. Chinese political culture can also be more generally
characterized as collectivist with high power distance and hierarchy,
where the state is seen as a major agent in implementing – but also
frustrating – radical change (interviews, 2014–2016), while also being
persistently ‘under-institutionalized’ (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011),
experimental and opportunistic (Heilmann, 2008).
Attending to the globally significant and singular case of China also
brings out the particular significance of several important elements of
this shift in theoretical perspective, forcing a confrontation with two
particularly important issues. As argued elsewhere (Tyfield, 2014),
these are:
• first, the obvious, ‘common-sense’ importance of politics, state and
government in contemporary Chinese everyday life. The corollary is
thus a strategic pragmatism that works with and takes for granted
that uncontrollable, shifting and high-stakes context, giving rise to
an everyday politics (see Zuev et al., forthcoming). This may be
contrasted with a dominant Western paradigm that strives for un-
derstanding of techno-economic change (and even socio-technical
change) without such causal centrality accorded to political and/or
power-relation issues; and,
• secondly, the way in which especially today, in the context of both a
‘rising’ China and various global crises, a ‘landscape’ of supposedly
exogenous and stable political economic relations cannot be taken
as given for the analysis, nor even as a useful first heuristic (Geels,
2014), but is itself profoundly changing. Indeed, in China this
grander ‘landscape’ is precisely and explicitly what is in play
(Jakobson, 2007; Segal, 2010) in terms of techno-nationalist ambi-
tions and strategies invested in the electric car as vehicles (meta-
phorical and possibly literal) for China's final ascent back to global
geo-political and techno-scientific centrality. Hence the ongoing
shaping of low‑carbon innovation and transition in China cannot be
understood except to the extent it recognises the scale of the current
ambitions in terms of transforming (even landscape-level) power
Fig. 1. Complex socio-technical power/knowledge systems.
1 The term “user” is problematic in the context of our study (see e.g. Oudshoorn and
Pinch, 2003) but we stick with the term, while remaining cognizant of its shortcomings,
due to the lack of clearly superior alternatives.
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relations, as well as the constellation of power relations behind
those ambitions in the first place. In short, projects of low‑carbon
mobility transition in China quite evidently go well beyond mere
‘greening’ of Chinese cities within given global geopolitical ‘land-
scapes’.
These two considerations in turn point to two key foci for empirical
research into low‑carbon transitions. First, dynamic assemblages of
power/knowledge relations, instantiated in specific and situated ev-
eryday social practices and subjectivities, are the essential resource for
implementing changes in specific settings. Focusing on practices in this
way also significantly opens up the relevant system in question, from
the techno-economic system of urban (car-based) transport to systems
of mobility (Dennis and Urry, 2009; Urry, 2004). Indeed, as evidence of
the importance of this neglected dimension, the lack of knowledge
about the local user practices and everyday politics of mobility has
actually caused a governance crisis in several Chinese cities dealing
with specific modes of transportation essential for the sustainability
transition: electric-two wheelers (Wells and Lin, 2015).
Secondly, this empirical focus on dynamic clusters of everyday
practices of mobility systems is examined through the lens of power/
knowledge relations constitutive of a society (at both ‘regime’ and
‘landscape’ levels) in parallel with trajectories of specific socio-tech-
nical innovations. In other words, the goal here is to construct plausible
(Wilkinson et al., 2013), if necessarily uncertain, trajectories over the
short- to medium-term of how transition may occur – and, inseparably,
who it may serve to empower and disable or newly burden. This is thus
an analysis of low‑carbon transition as an exercise in power-aware
strategic wisdom, or phronesis (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012). It thus asks
(Flyvbjerg, 2004): how are power relations regarding the e-mobility
system in China tendentially developing, who gains and who loses and
by which mechanisms of power?
As we will show, however, examined from this perspective a dy-
namic picture emerges regarding the prospects and possible futures of
low‑carbon innovation in China, that is strikingly different to, and more
open than, that offered by either the dominant framing in terms of hi-
tech advance or an analysis in terms of socio-technical system lock-in
and contesting ‘niches’ (Fig. 2).
What follows, therefore, is a preliminary summary and illustration
of this framework, drawing on both existing literature, (re-)interpreted
through the power relational perspective, together with original
empirical fieldwork, likewise framed by this approach. As regards the
latter, the article presents the results of a two-year-long empirical study
based on fieldwork and participant observation in three major Chinese
cities (Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing) and Shandong province (see
Appendix for anonymized list of interviewees). We make references to
secondary data (research reports, web-documents, media releases and
policy documents) and primary data collected via over 50 in-depth
interviews and seven focus-groups with academic and marketing ex-
perts, car-users, manufacturers, infrastructure providers, government
and planning officials, and transportation NGO experts.2 Interviews
were also conducted with relevant foreign government, manufacturing
and academic experts working in China.
The focus-groups in Beijing3 and Shenzhen were conducted with
different groups of users (e-bike informal transportation providers
(heiche), EV-taxi drivers, car-users). We also succeeded in having a
mixed gender representation amongst taxi-drivers and car-owners. Each
focus-group consisted of six to seven participants where attempts were
made to make the sample as representative as possible, in particular
trying to include people of different socioeconomic, educational and
professional background. As for the expert interviews, after the initial
exploratory stage, follow-up interviews with senior managers in various
urban mobility start-ups and car-sharing companies in Shanghai and
Shenzhen allowed observation of the development of low‑carbon mo-
bility innovation in Chinese cities. The interview data was supple-
mented by fieldwork notes which consisted of informal conversations,
diary notes, visual ethnography and observations in nine different lo-
cations in China visited during the two years of the project. The final
batch of data comes from a collaborative knowledge production sta-
keholder workshop that was organized by the project team in Shenzhen
in March 20164.
Fig. 2. From multi-level perspective (MLP) to
systems of power/knowledge relations.
2 The project is titled ‘Low Carbon Innovation in China – Prospects, Politics and
Practice’ and we gratefully acknowledge the funding from the UK's ESRC, 2013–17, grant
number ES/K006002/1.
3 We acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of our colleagues, Zhu Di at Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing and Li Ping at Tsinghua University, Shenzhen in co-
organization of the focus-groups.
4 We thank our project colleague, Li Ping (of the Graduate School, Tsinghua University,
Shenzhen) for his invaluable assistance in arranging this event.
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3. The Chinese case of urban e-mobility transition
China represents a distinctive case of (attempted) sustainability
transition, being a post-socialist state, where the automobility sector
was virtually non-existent until 1995; e.g. just two million vehicles
were produced per annum as recently as 2000 (Personal Cars and
China, 2003) for a country of 1.3 billion people.
The future of urban mobility, including in China, undoubtedly re-
quires significant low‑carbon innovation and this is acknowledged at
the highest levels of government, as well as within business, both pri-
vate and state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Indeed, low‑carbon mobility is
understood as a significant, once-in-a-generation opportunity for China
to develop innovations of global stature in this key economic sector. In
particular, the EV has been imagined as a “national hero” (Tillemann,
2015: 16) and as the route towards Chinese breakthrough – “overtaking
round the corner” in the language of Science Minister (and former Audi
executive) Wan Gang – into the global automotive oligopoly.
This is, of course, an intensely competitive industry with high bar-
riers to entry from proprietary technologies and tacit knowledge ca-
pacities of global (supply chain) management, innovation and
branding. The EV has thus been invested with intense hopes in China to
be a key pillar of the broader project of squaring globalized economic
growth and continued one-party-state government through global in-
novation leadership (Cf Zhao, 2010 on ICTs), and hence the key policy
priority regarding China's programme of low‑carbon mobility transi-
tion.
In the context of highly fragmented and locally protected auto-
motive industry in China (Thun, 2006), and the related political context
of techno-nationalism (Jakobson, 2007; Zhao, 2010), the apparent op-
portunities presented by the EV have proven decisive in setting the
policy agenda. Moreover, the seeming need for significant government
support to develop a viable EV system appears to play to another
supposed strength of the Chinese political economy. For instance, a shift
to the EV involves considerable challenges of coordination (Tyfield,
2013), such as the construction of infrastructures for charging batteries
before there is any consumer demand for such vehicles. Similarly, while
there is a clear consensus in China in favour of pursuing EV innovation,
other nation-states capable of mounting such an initiative are aligned
with automotive companies that see the internal combustion engine
(ICE), not the EV, as their priority and advantage (Germany, Japan); or
have political economies not inclined to a strong programme of in-
dustrial policy (UK); or both (US).5
In 2010, EVs were declared a ‘key strategic industry for the next 5
years’, and RMB100 billion (£10 billion) of government support was
announced. Targets of producing 500,000 EVs by 2015 and 5 million by
2020 were announced. To encourage demand, a 0% sales tax was in-
troduced, along with subsidies of RMB 60,000 from the central gov-
ernment, which was matched by some cities (notably Shenzhen, home
of the company, BYD) and even some districts.6 Furthermore, a pro-
gramme focusing on the ‘electrification’ of mobility within 25 major
pilot cities was also introduced.
All this support for an industrial and technological project would
suggest significant strides would follow towards Chinese global lea-
dership in EV transition. Yet, there have been numerous challenges.
First, in terms of the EV as an agent of low‑carbon transition, there are
serious questions regarding their emissions, especially in China (Huo
et al., 2010). Nationally, over 70% of electricity is generated by coal,
and in many areas (particularly in the North and North-East) the per-
centage is much higher. As much of this coal is, in turn, of low quality
and burned in low efficiency power stations, the emissions associated
with EV mobility even exceed those of conventional ICE mobility in
some regions of China (iCET, 2011).
Moreover, despite the favourable conditions listed above, against
the target of 500,000 by 2015, fewer than 12,000 ‘alternative fuel ve-
hicles’ of any description (i.e. including HEVs) had been sold by end
2012. Sales subsequently climbed significantly in 2014 (Bidness etc.,
2015) and 2015, to approximately 220,000 vehicles (Reuters, 2015a),
but total sales remained approximately 26% below targets. Moreover,
while late 2015 saw sales surge, pushing the Chinese market into the
global top spot, figures have been brought into serious question as
many of the sales were ‘ghost cars’; accounting fictions used fraudu-
lently to claim government subsidies (Yang, 2016). This growth of EV
sales has also been based on those subsidies, yet government already
planned to reduce these as quickly as possible (by the end of the 13th
Five Year Plan in 2020) and will likely now do so ever more quickly in
light of the scale of the fraud. Increasing numbers ten-fold to 5 million
EVs (including plug-in hybrids) by 2020 thus seems a ‘Herculean’ task
(Yang, 2015a). And, in terms of transition, such numbers must also be
set alongside annual sales of over 20 million ICE cars.7 A rapid shift to
system domination by the EV thus remains implausible even if these
ambitious government targets are met.
Furthermore, up to 2015, EVs have also been largely purchased in
government procurement for municipal taxis (Li et al., 2016). Private
purchases of EVs in China remain a major challenge and utterly de-
pendent on the government subsidies and/or city-based policies of li-
censing that favour NEVs; for instance, EV manufacturer BYD‘s revenue
would have been negative in 2014 and 2015 without these subsidies
(Bloomberg, 2015a). Amongst automotive SOEs presented with gov-
ernment targets for developing what are unprofitable EVs as against
their profitable ICE businesses, the result has often been half-hearted
engagement at best, and positive foot-dragging (Wang, 2013) or ap-
parently now subsidy fraud at worst. Private automotive companies,
however, are more ambitious in pursuing an EV strategy (Bloomberg,
2015b). Geely Automobile Holdings plans new energy vehicles to make
up 90% of its sales and plans to offer them at prices equivalent to
conventional ICE vehicles.8
The usual explanations for this lack of progress concern issues of
immature and hence expensive battery technology and inadequate
charging infrastructures, which are undoubtedly important considera-
tions (Costa Maia et al., 2015). For instance, regarding the key chal-
lenge for e-mobility of charging, State Grid Corporation of China is
responsible for the masterplan of providing national charging infra-
structure. But there is no national EV-charging legislation, and each
province and municipality bases its legislation on local conditions,
especially when it comes to dealing with the major issue of property
management companies that manage public parking spaces (Wu, Ma
and Ou, 2015; Wu et al., 2015) and residential parking.
Even in the most developed regions, building charging infra-
structure is still meeting opposition from property management com-
panies, which require residents to have a designated parking space; a
prized and expensive resource. Central government has encouraged the
construction of charging piles and allocated central fiscal funds to
subsidize the provinces and enterprises which construct and operate
charging piles (Global Information, 2016), but oversees no national
policy drive.
In practice, since 2014 the charging infrastructure has been co-
created by multiple state and private actors (including foreign compa-
nies such as Tesla and their Supercharger program) and entrepreneurs9
(Global Information, Inc., 2016). Some of the most notable players in
5 See Schamp, 2014 on the possible exception of France.
6 According to the list announced by Beijing, six EV models were subsidized with
subsidies ranging from RMB63,000 to RMB108,000. The six EV models on the list are
DENZA and E6 made by BYD; Roewe E50 made by SAIC Motor; ZINORO made by
Brilliance Auto; E150 EV and C70GB made by Beijing Automotive Group; and iEV4 made
by JAC Motor.
7 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/569e90c0-a000-11e5-8613-08e211ea5317.html.
8 In July 2017, Geely's foreign subsidiary, Volvo, also announced that none of its cars
will be purely ICE-propelled by 2019: https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/
single/en/9928-Volvo-s-EV-push-hints-at-China-s-electric-ambition.
9 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/26/content_28058742.htm.
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this field have been TELD10 (Shandong province), BYD (Shenzhen) and
Potevio (Shenzhen). It is also important to note the geographical un-
evenness of the development of charging infrastructure in residential
areas, with eastern coastal regions, capital cities and Guangdong pro-
vince in the south benefitting the most while several regions in the West
are literally untouched (Wu, Ma and Ou, 2015).
Notwithstanding these crucial techno-economic hurdles, though,
conceived as a process of socio-technical system change there is no
reason they must be considered as primary, let alone definitive. Indeed,
it must also be stressed that even the now-growing numbers of EV
purchases, including by private drivers, should not be mistaken as
evidence per se of a smooth unfolding of system transition. To the
contrary, such growing adoption of the EV remains dwarfed by con-
tinuing growth of the ICE car market and thus a minor and com-
plementary niche. Here, in other words, we confront the perennial
question and test for MLP-framed analyses of how to illuminate in real-
time the crucial, strategic and uncertain path from niche to regime
disruption. Instead, exploring EV innovation in China from a complex
power/knowledge relational perspective suggests many of the key
challenges and sources of current stasis are political-cultural, and as
such both largely overlooked by this form of analysis and likely to
persist, especially insofar as these factors remain neglected by policy
and strategy.
4. Socio-technical and power relational stasis
The political-cultural issues regarding EV transition in China are
multiple and complex, involving issues of: industrial and innovation
policy (for different industries, ICE cars, EVs, electronics and ICTs, oil/
gas/(gasified) coal, infrastructure and construction, and so on); en-
vironmental politics; and rapidly changing social power relations at the
‘ground’ level of society, including issues of consumerism, social dis-
tinction and even gender relations. Given the very ‘systemic’ nature of
the challenges, however, instead of aiming for comprehensive analysis
we focus instead on the illumination of key points of strategic blockage
and leverage. In this context, analysing this field can be usefully divided
it up into issues of e-mobility system producer and user perspectives.
The striking picture that emerges in both cases, however, is one of both
considerable tensions and, more importantly (in the next section), sig-
nificant dynamism and change in power relations that in turn demand an
opening up beyond the ‘EV’ and ‘transport’ frames to analysis in terms
of mobility systems.
Crucial throughout the Chinese approach to EV transition is how it
is framed at the national level by the constitutive tensions of a techno-
nationalism, by way of a deeper engagement with a changing globali-
zation (Zhao, 2010). This tension is then manifest through fragmented
authoritarianism (Mertha, 2009) in a geographically diverse devolution
of decision-making power into ‘local state corporatism’ (Oi, 1992; see
also Nolan, 2004; Huang, 2002, 2009; Thun, 2006). Together these
forces affect the key issue of (uneven) local implementation of top-
down directives, and shape the continued relative failure of break-
through of the EV.
More concretely, three overlapping dimensions characterize this
diversity of EV policy implementation. There is first the distinction
between regions with powerful automotive SOEs and those with private
companies (or none at all). Second, there is the extent to which re-
gional/provincial/local industrial policy privileges the (central party-)
state or markets and private enterprise, and thence the openness to
global business. And third, we can examine the localized power of
‘carbon capital’ interests (of companies and individuals who dis-
proportionately benefit from oil-based industries) (Urry, 2013: 75) vis-
à-vis other industrial sectors, notably electronics and/or what may be
termed ‘digital capital’. Along each dimension, Shanghai may be
identified as archetype of the former (Huang, 2009) and Shenzhen of
the latter. Both locations are also central to efforts at EV transition in
China, but importantly, as yet, neither has succeeded in incubating the
conditions of transition at the system (‘regime’) level.
In Shanghai, a local economic model of state-led industry that in-
cludes a powerful incumbent SOE ICE-automotive industry raises ser-
ious questions about the extent to which, for all its stated goals of
prioritizing EVs, policy actually supports EVs – not just in the abstract,
but in competition with ICE cars (Cohen, 2010). Conversely, Shenzhen's
strength lies in the absence of a major state-owned automotive cor-
poration and the presence instead of digital capital giants and an en-
trepreneurial culture. But the flipside is that Shenzhen is not party to
the most powerful coalition shaping national Chinese automotive pol-
itics.
At national level, this fragmentation of power relations contributes
to the key government grievance regarding China's car industry and a
continuing issue for the attempted hi-tech EV transition – i.e. the con-
tinuing domination of the foreign JV partners, including in ownership
and innovation of key technologies (Winebrake et al., 2008). Indeed,
this forms something of a positive feedback loop between the intensity
of Chinese policy's specific hi-tech focus, pursued in the hope of recti-
fying this problem, and its ongoing disappointment, in inadequate im-
plementation of national high-technology-push policies.
Despite the booming production, diversified manufacturing land-
scape and the growth of official sales figures, the actual use of EVs and
their visibility in Chinese cities is still very low. But even the figures in
question11 still account for just a little over 1% of the total annual car
market in China.12 In comparison, in Norway, EVs have a 22% market
share. Even with legitimately acquired subsidies at national and pro-
vincial level, “fast-movers”, such as BYD, have EV production and
marketing at an embryonic level (Masiero et al., 2016). Moreover,
while adoption of EVs (as ‘electric cars’) benefits from several com-
plementarities and synergies with the existing ICE system of auto-
mobility (e.g. development of road and parking infrastructures, driving
instruction or capacities for development of car bodies and factories),
these conditions all tend to benefit the incumbent system dis-
proportionately more, deepening its lock-in. In short, then, the politics
and power relations on the producer side significantly constrain the
convergence of forces onto an effective and nationally implemented
industrial strategy in favour of the EV over the ICE.
These conclusions are merely strengthened by considering a key
issue overlooked by current hi-tech supply-side policy, namely, con-
sumer demand (Cf Wolf et al., 2015) and the issues of user politics. In
recent years in China the car has become the number one consumer
aspiration; an essential aspect of the extraordinarily rapid current
construction of an automobility socio-technical system.13
Cars are increasingly affordable for growing numbers of Chinese.
But this demand is complex and is not simply a matter of consumption
utility preferences, complicating the cultural politics of automobility
purchases. Rather, in a post-socialist country characterized by ‘in-
dividualization without individualism’ (Yan, 2010), in which the do-
mains of increasing personal autonomy reside squarely in the economic
as opposed to the civic sphere, consumerism is of heightened social and
political significance. It is primarily through the consumption practices
of oneself and one's family that contemporary Chinese citizens can
exercise their individual freedom, cultivate a sense of individual and
networked-collective identity and put it and their material success upon
display, and hence claim a certain social status and personal quality
(suzhi) (Yu, 2014; Anagnost, 2004). Demand thus depends not only on
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et al., 2014; Shove et al., 2012), but also on how these practices are
changing in ways charged with social importance.
At first, this involved the car being primarily a status symbol.
Focusing on economic success or freedom, this conditions the adulation
of a particularly unlimited and conspicuous form of wealth (Zavoretti,
2013). In the circumstances of personal affective investment and the
bodily experience of consumption of autonomous mobility, the car as-
sumes an almost unrivalled position. This is compounded by the mul-
tiple novel risks, technological and financial, assumed in growing car
ownership. Together these manifest as a strong preference for big, ex-
pensive, foreign cars with powerful engines associated with high
quality, more interior comfort and advanced technology; elements of a
‘Western’ lifestyle to which many Chinese aspire, as marks of high suzhi.
The conventional fossil-fuel car has thus been to date a key element in
the forming of the social identity of the Chinese ‘middle class’ (Zhou
and Qin, 2010; Yu, 2014). And given the importance of this stratum of
society for broader regime legitimacy (Guo, 2008; Goodman, 2015),
this suggests serious political obstacles to policies that would penalize
the petrol-powered ‘car’ in support of an EV alternative (e.g. The
Economist, 2016a).
Today market tastes are developing fast. According to Gao et al.
(2016), the two top car attributes that matter to Chinese consumers
today are brand and price, while it is still the second most important
family investment (after an apartment). Chinese consumers are be-
coming thriftier when buying a car and more open to purely instru-
mental or pragmatic criteria. Yet the political power of this appetite for
the car remains. Meanwhile, whether on status or price, the EV is still
regarded as a relatively unattractive option, even as national brands of
EVs (such as BYD) are becoming increasingly popular.
Interviews and focus groups in 2014/15 with actual and potential
EV drivers also revealed widespread concerns about risks of EVs.
Inadequately developed charging infrastructure has been identified as
one key reason for remaining low levels of EV sales to individuals (Gao
et al., 2016); findings corroborated by our own interviews, in which the
“slow” development of charging infrastructure was likewise con-
tinuously mentioned to explain slow acceptance of EVs by urban re-
sidents. But the risks here also concern the lack of knowledge about the
inside of the technology – specifically its battery pack and influence of
the battery on health and safety of the user. In particular, the issue of
“radiation” or magnetic field from the battery was a common theme in
the focus-group interviews with EV taxi drivers in Shenzhen, conducted
in 2015.
The much-hyped growth in sales in recent years can be also ex-
plained by growing difficulty for aspiring car drivers to acquire a car
license plate in big cities such as Shanghai or Shenzhen. The act of EV
purchase thus hardly signifies a change towards environmental con-
sumer choices amongst Chinese consumers, but rather the pragmatic
approach of the users to accessing car ownership in whatever form
presents itself as possible.
This has further implications for the sustainability credentials of EV
adoption. For instance, a survey conducted by Shanghai Electric Vehicle
Public Data Collecting Monitoring Center suggests that majority of the
PHEV (plug-in hybrid) owners in the city rarely charged their cars and
ran them predominantly in petrol mode (SHEVDC report, 2015), simply
taking advantage of the free license plate without using their electric
capabilities.14 Again, therefore, we see that, even as EV sales pick up,
propelling China into the global top spot in this market, this metric
must not be confused with evidence of a growing momentum of system
transition to a dominant low‑carbon e-mobility regime.
A decade of significant policy efforts to encourage the shift to EVs –
their production and consumption – thus appears to evidence separate
spheres of evolving ‘normal’ consumer aspiration for mobility, in terms
of desire for a car, on the one hand, and of ‘low‑carbon’ EV mobility
innovation, in terms of the various technology-push policies of gov-
ernment support, on the other. The prospects of an EV sociotechnical
transition, by contrast, would need these to co-evolve and to converge.
Evidence of this process, however, is forthcoming once we broaden our
perspective, focusing on dynamic systems of power relations in parallel
with changing innovations, beyond the lens of the electric car and
transport to the co-evolution of e-mobility systems.
5. Socio-technical and power relational dynamism
To start with, we must consider developments in the politics and
governance of the EV sector itself. The sales of EVs in China stumbled in
2014 but 2015–2016 was marked by growing sales and increasing
visibility of EVs of national and foreign brands in the cities, while EV
car-sharing schemes have grown rapidly across the country. This
booming EV start-up environment led to some further important gov-
ernment announcements, aiming to regulate the “creative chaos” in
Chinese EV-manufacturing (Dunne, 2016).
First, there is the decision to limit the number of EV start-ups,
leaving just 10 out of 200 players, with the aim of increasing tech-
nology standards. Secondly, in November 2016 the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology15 formally decided to regulate the low
speed electric vehicle production, which has boomed in recent years but
remained in a legal grey zone (Fang and Zhu, 2015; Tyfield and Zuev,
2016). These measures coincided with the enforced and concerted ef-
fort to eliminate the electric two-wheelers (E2Ws) from the streets of
some major cities (Shepard, 2016).
To understand these developments, however, they must be situated
within more deep-seated political challenges currently afoot that con-
dition a situation of considerable dynamism, even as the domination of
SOEs, and of the state-capitalist model of development more generally,
seemingly remains entrenched. First, there is the growing corporate
competition regarding future mobility between SOEs, opening up and
contesting power relations in that domain, particularly between tele-
coms and electricity and car companies.
Secondly, though, is the growing success of private Chinese busi-
nesses in creating just the kind of global and hi-tech brands for which
the government, and broader population, aspire. These, however, are
not predominately in the car industry (notwithstanding the growth of
private companies such as BYD or Geely), or indeed any of the sectors of
heavy industry dominated by the increasing number of massive SOEs
that feature in the Fortune Global 500 of the world's biggest firms (by
revenue). Rather, they are in ICTs, electronics and social media and are
quintessentially identified with the more global and entrepreneurial
provinces of the south and south-east, specifically Guangdong (which
includes Shenzhen) and Zhejiang.
This would include the still-emerging digital innovations and web
2.0 social media or the ‘digital capital’ players, such as Baidu, Alibaba
and Tencent (collectively, the ‘BATs’) (Tse, 2016). Moreover, ICTs have
been an unquestionable technological revolution and commercial suc-
cess in China recently – and a largely Chinese one to boot – as against
the relative stasis of the EV and car industries. On the user side, China
now has more regular users of the internet, and increasingly the mobile
internet, than any other country (674 million in 2015, or more than the
US and India – numbers 2 and 3 in global rankings – combined).16 In
this context, the emergence of imaginaries of smart mobility and mo-
bility-as-a-service (The Economist, 2016b) has been firmly grasped (and
shaped) by the ICT giants as their opportunity to become industrial
pillars of the 21st century; and on a global scale that has largely eluded
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Dynamism regarding e-mobility in China is thus primarily observable in
terms of just this digitized mobility system, with the EV seen as a mere,
if crucial, constituent thereof.
Digital mobility and EV innovations are thus beginning to develop
in multiple complementary, if not yet seamlessly intertwining, ways.
The importance of ICTs in EV manufacturing and the use of EVs in
various mobility services is evident. ICT companies are providing di-
gital technologies and establishing digital platforms for connecting
users that create a sense of digital communities of users while si-
multaneously collecting data about car users' behaviour (Zipser et al.,
2016).
Chinese ICT companies do not pretend to have vehicle production
expertise nor manufacturing facilities, and they also do not have actual
license to manufacture automobiles. But they are in strong position to
support and develop e-mobility-related digital innovation and establish
new joint-ventures with traditional (local and foreign) car-manu-
facturers that are strong in automobile technology (e.g. all three of the
BATs with Audi and SAIC with Alibaba). Chinese ICT companies also
have competitive advantages over foreign tech companies in China,
with the latter facing heavy regulation and, due to internet filters,
providing limited access to their products.
Crucially for the development of an EV industry, the co-evolution of
ICT companies, automobile manufacturers and battery producers is
accompanying the co-creation of a different knowledge organizational
framework where the knowledge is exchanged and supplemented for
creating a cutting-edge artefact. It involves later stages of servicing the
new product (EV), building infrastructure on demand for charging and
repair, and constant upgrading and updating the product.
As such, while “carbon (state) capital” players, such as (fossil-fuel-
based) electricity generators and traditional SOE car manufacturers, are
slowly, with government funding, shifting production capacities to ac-
commodate the EV manufacturing and infrastructures demanded by
central government, digital capital actors are simultaneously exploring
opportunities for smart EV production using their own monies. In 2015
Tencent Holdings, the largest Chinese software giant, announced its
agreement with Hon Hai (Foxconn) manufacturing and Harmony Auto
dealers to enter electric vehicle production (Reuters, 2015b), and with
BMW i segment joining in 2016. Moreover, spurred by competition,
several key representatives of Chinese digital capital announced their
plans to participate in the smart EV race with each player setting ever
bolder goals. Alibaba (e-commerce giant) has paired with SAIC motors.
Baidu (China's leading search engine) announced independent entrance
in the smart and driverless car production.
This followed a separate race in 2014 between the Chinese ICT
companies to sign deals with taxi apps, both local Chinese versions
Kuaidi and Didi and, belatedly Uber. Subsequently Didi has emerged
pre-eminent after acquisition of a stake in Uber in 2016, and Uber
quitting the Chinese market. The merger ended several years of mul-
timillion dollar competition and has created a significant scale in a ride-
sharing business in China, again with significant BATs involvement and
investment.
This massive surge in corporate activity in digital‑carbon capital
alliances since 2015 suggests an emerging promotion of the EV as a
digital commodity or service, rather than a conventional car, with a
price only a few times higher than an authentic Apple computer.17 It
would seem likely that the EVs affordances and its technological base
will be developed by digital, software giants, who have the ready ca-
pital for investment and the requisite technological expertise for this
new type of vehicle and the massive amounts of data-processing in-
volved in their increasingly ready access. Crucially, though, understood
as a process of dynamic power momentum, popular acceptance of this
reimagining of the ‘car’, of which there is also embryonic evidence (see
below), could condition a significant challenge to the seemingly un-
assailable power dominance of the ICE as carbon (state) capital con-
stellation, as demands for its goods and services wanes.
At this stage there remain many legitimate questions regarding the
credibility of digital capital claims regarding future mobility. But what
is undeniable is that these corporate moves show how socially im-
portant is another sociocultural trend in contemporary Chinese in-
novation politics, namely the omnipresent undercurrent of competition
with ‘Silicon Valley’. To be a progressive and future-oriented digital
capitalist in China increasingly means that one has to be (or at least
sound) like Google or Apple and be investing surplus capital in new
projects, in this concrete case related to mobility devices. Again, in MLP
terms, this is precisely a matter of imputed and intentional competition
at landscape level.
Moreover, the EV itself also exemplifies this. The privately-pur-
chased EV most readily visible on Chinese streets still in 2016, albeit in
limited numbers and in the more prosperous megacities (Beijing,
Shanghai, Shenzhen), was Tesla. This is so even as the Chinese brand
BYD led in 2016 both in PHEV and EV sales18 for the simple reason that
the Tesla model S is a striking sports-car saloon (all of which are fa-
mously EVs), while BYD vehicles are largely indistinguishable to the
untrained eye from other conventional ICE cars. Moreover, while BYD
models are often purchased for taxi and car-sharing services, Tesla S
models are bought as luxury sports cars. Sales figures early in 2015
suggested Tesla has struggled in China, and it has been scolded by its
Chinese customers and employees, many of whom were sacked in a
significant downscaling of sales-staff in 2014 which influenced lik-
ability of Tesla.19 Yet its sales rebounded in 2016, reaching nearly
2000 units in the first quarter, well on its way to the company's goal of
5000 for the year. The sales boom has continued in 2017, precipitating
the milestone agreement to build a first Tesla factory outside of US in
China, near Shanghai.20
Moreover, regardless of its own corporate fortunes, it seems un-
deniable that Tesla's presence in China has dramatically shaken up and
accelerated activity around the EV. This is the case in terms of eliciting
bigger promises from central government for public charging infra-
structure projects (Yang, 2015b), or scaring the automotive SOEs into
more ambitious activity, or simply illuminating the competitive
medium-term possibilities in establishing dominant positions over 21st
century urban mobility for companies outside the automotive sector,
like digital capital. In short, then, while the incumbent politics of EV
production remain heavily stacked in favour of high‑carbon SOEs, the
emergence of both critical immanent challenges to this structure of
power relations and significant ‘external’ experiments showing in-
creasing success together present a dynamic picture of potential in-
stability and/or transition. And it is a reading of contemporary Chinese
e-mobility innovation through the lens of dynamic power relations
across the mobility system that reveals this dynamism, not just the lock-
in at the level of the ‘car’.
Regarding user politics, a similar conclusion emerges. The politics of
mobility consumption are dynamic and may be subject to rapid change.
Indeed, the social meaning of the ‘middle class’, with which these issues
are intimately bound, is far from settled and is the site of considerable
political and socio-cultural agency by multiple groups seeking owner-
ship and/or control of this increasingly empowered label (Tyfield,
2017). The meaning of ‘middle class’ in this context is of particular
relevance, as it is the most systemically enabled group to drive the
changes in the knowledge and power nexus. Notably, it is also the
middle class, the educated and well-off, often West-oriented urban-re-
sident individuals who are leading China's discourse of environmental
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justice and sustainability.
Yet the two key issues with which the car is increasingly associated
in China are significant problems, and not experiences of ‘freedom’ on
the ‘open road’ as in multiple icons of mid-20th century American
culture, integral elements of the ‘American Dream’ and US hegemony
(Paterson, 2007). These two issues are air pollution (Qin, 2015) and
daily gridlocked congestion. In both cases, this poses serious challenges
to the construction of a middle class identity of hoped-for (‘moderately
well-off’, xiaokang) prosperity and increasing quality of life in which the
‘car’ – privately owned and parked, ICE, four-door etc. – retains its
centrality.
Rather the car is increasingly associated with trade-offs that tarnish,
and so threaten, the entire social vision – now formalized in the new
top-level political discourse of ‘China Dream’ – of contemporary
Chinese modernity and progress. For instance, a recent study by
Sandow (2011) in Sweden shows that a long or painful commuter ex-
perience is directly linked to personal unhappiness and a loss of family
cohesion (see also Putnam, 1995). This could have far-reaching con-
sequences in undermining the popular imaginary and ‘common sense’
upon which the current Chinese political economic order is built:
Americans and Europeans did not face such trade-offs in their rise to
‘middle class’ prosperity in the mid-20th century, but rather achieved
that prosperity precisely through growing (ICE) car ownership. As a
result, significant shifts, including in government policy to accom-
modate these tensions, might be expected.
Thus faced with the persistent challenges of air pollution (Kahn and
Zheng, 2016; Reuters, 2015a) and congestion, the ‘car’ serves to sen-
sitize Chinese urban residents to issues that may problematise further
entrenchment of the existing automobility system. This is particularly
so for the emerging middle class(es), as it is this group that has the
existing resources, incentive and leverage to demand improvements in
their quality of life, such as in their environment and access to ‘clean’
city-living (food, water, air etc.…) and ‘liveability’. Similarly, when
owning a car means that one must set off to work very early or very late
to avoid congestion, it becomes apparent that what is valued is not the
car per se but the personalized mobility.
Such dynamics already seem to be in evidence. For instance, an-
other link between the car-ownership and congestion concerns the car
as an important item of conspicuous consumption in China. This in-
cludes the desire to demonstrate purchasing power leading to owner-
ship of the second family car. As discussed above, however, recent
surveys suggest that Chinese car owners are becoming more practical
and less status-conscious than ever (Gao et al., 2016). In this context,
two developments seem particularly important.
First, small, inexpensive and Chinese-branded EVs are increasingly
attractive as second cars, often in gendered ways as ‘her car’. The
added attraction of easier and/or cheaper access to a license plate
significantly compounds this appeal. Yet, interestingly, the majority of
electric vehicle (EV) owners are keen to buy EVs again, and the pro-
portion of consumers who say they are interested in buying an EV has
tripled since 2011. Secondly, car-sharing has increased its appeal
while car-ownership in general is not losing its stronghold, with
second-hand cars becoming highly sought after. Taken together, these
trends suggest a ‘both/and’ situation may be developing in the short-/
medium-term in which families able to afford a car continue to buy a
conventional, foreign-branded ‘first’ car but also increasingly experi-
ment with, and become pleasantly acquainted with, EVs and car-
sharing or both.
In these circumstances, then, a new openness may be emerging to
multiple possible alternative models of urban mobility, especially in
China's biggest, most prosperous cities that brings adoption of the EV
with it, rather than as primary driver. This includes a growing will-
ingness to experiment with forms of mobility, including intermodal
travel, where cars will no longer dominate the urban landscape and
commuters could use a scheme of inter-connected personal-vehicle-
cum-public-transportation. According to the IBM commuter pain index
survey, 20 residents in both Shenzhen and Beijing were already in 2011
open to switch to public transport under certain conditions, such that it
is fast, less crowded and/or low‑carbon. Two unprecedented air pol-
lution red alerts in December 2015 in Beijing21 show how little things
have improved since 2011 (Kahn and Zheng, 2016) and that new
measures are needed to take China's cars off the streets (Muscat, 2015).
Evidence for such changes in user mobility cultures and politics
emerges from diverse quarters and forms of mobility, including emer-
ging ride-hailing and car-sharing initiatives. This may include EV fleets,
such as one established by major SOE Shanghai Auto (SAIC) in 2014
and multiple schemes in Shenzhen. But also of potentially crucial, if
systematically overlooked, significance in China is extraordinary
bottom-up success of the electric two-wheeler (Cherry et al., 2016),
with over 200 million on China's roads, and the role of public vehicle
sharing systems (Lohry and Yiu, 2015;Wu Ma and Ou, 2015;Wu et al.,
2015). Since September 2016, this would also include the mushrooming
success of smartphone app-enabled access to conventional bicycles.
These initiatives, such as MoBike and multiple copycat competitors, are
already ubiquitous in Chinese cities and even growing overseas after
less than one year, though many are plagued by problems (such as bi-
cycle theft), suggesting the boom is unsustainable (Yang and Yang,
2017); a familiar dynamic of Chinese innovation (Kirkegaard, 2016).
Ongoing changes in mobility choice are further bolstered by im-
portant generational changes in China, again specifically around digital
technologies and their deepening ‘common-sense’ mediation of ev-
eryday life (Yu, 2014; Keith et al., 2013). In 2017, those now in their
mid-twenties or younger have grown up in a post-'89 China – the
“strawberries” (caomei) generation (Lin and Sun, 2010). A new cos-
mopolitized, Westernized outlook amongst a young “xiaozi” class (lit-
erally “petty bourgeoisie”, but connoting more “bourgeois bohemian”
or “bobo”) has emerged in China (Wang, 2008). These young urbanites
may well not yet be able to afford certain products, such as a car or an
EV, but are also more likely to experiment with new things, such as
personal digital gadgetry or new (shared) vehicles, and have greater
awareness of developments and forms of life elsewhere in the world.
They are also more likely than previous generations to check the In-
ternet for other people's usage experiences or comments (Wang et al.,
2016).
At the same time, important technological and institutional synergy
may be emerging between electric two-wheelers and EVs (Zuev et al.,
forthcoming). Indeed, the development of low speed EVs and E2Ws in
China may be a signal example of co-evolution (Cf Geels and Raven,
2007), where development and growth of both sectors as powerful
clusters leads to political pressure on surrounding institutional and
governance structures to change. Regarding the power relational dy-
namics in this case, both sectors are also noticeable as having developed
autonomously, without support from the technology-push policies of
government. As such, they instantiate the broader lessons regarding the
private sector ‘disruptive’ innovators characteristic of China's growing
innovative capacity (Breznitz and Murphree, 2011; Tse, 2016; Atherton
and Newman, 2017; Tyfield, 2017). Most importantly, that the central
government is now paying these sectors, and the industrial opportu-
nities they present,− systematically neglected to date by the high-tech
imaginaries of the EV technology-supply policies – greater attention is a
political development of considerable significance.
In short, regarding quintessential blockages and system lock-ins in
both producer and user realms, the expansion of analytical perspective
to a broader co-evolution of changing power relations and evolving
sociotechnical and power relational systems of mobility points to sig-
nificant dynamism in urban mobility transition.
20 http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/35359.wss; Time (2014).
21 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/21/beijings-smog-red-alert-enters-
third-day-as-toxic-haze-shrouds-city.
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6. Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of the crucial global case study of
urban mobility transition in China from a perspective that explores
dynamic evolving power/knowledge relations of mobility systems. This
shows, situates and explains continuing disappointment regarding mass
adoption of the electric car in China, corroborating familiar arguments
about techno-economic lock-in to the ‘car system’. But by focusing on
the broader issue of innovation across mobility systems and the parallel
reshaping of power/knowledge relations potentially constitutive of new
trajectories of socio-technical and political-cultural change, it also
foregrounds a highly dynamic vista.
This incorporates fast-changing corporate capacities, collaborations
and coalitions on the producer side, and fast-evolving consumer tastes,
identities and common-senses on the user side, together increasingly
reshaping even the high politics of government policy priorities and
power concentrations. And this dynamism emerges into view from at-
tendance to both changing everyday user practices of mobility and the
parallel evolution of the domestic and international politics of China.
Exploring how these specific socio-technical trajectories are evolving in
parallel with the latter also affords the crucial capacity to analyse this
process without assuming a familiar Euro-centric political context of
liberal democratic states and explicit ‘political’ action.
Our purpose in setting out this illustration has been two-fold. First,
to show the analytical benefits of adopting the power/knowledge re-
lational twist on socio-technical systems analysis, illustrated with and
motivated by a crucial case study in its own right; and thereby to make
the broader argument for the applicability of this political-cultural
systemic approach to research into the potential future impacts of
specific cases of sociotechnical change as it can strategically illuminate
prospective, and not just retrospective, construction of system transition
– as complex cycles of growing power momentum. Moreover, this ap-
proach offers insights into such unfolding trajectories across the world,
including in significant geographical contexts that may be different to
those presumed by Global North-based theorizing (especially relevant,
for example, in other crucial cases, such as India). In this way, this
approach promises to illuminate real-time global transitions that do not
presume any essential continuity with existing Western-dominate geo-
politics; and to do so in ways that are strategically and prospectively
insightful, and not merely explanatory and post hoc.
As regards the former point, our analysis reveals several key in-
sights. Despite the popular (Western) vision that Chinese state can
simply issue top-down technology plans that change the order of things,
this is clearly not the case. Rather, there remains a disappointing stasis
in the grand plan of a rapid transition to electric cars in China's growing
cities. In many respects, this is because of a persistent hi-tech focus of
policy, ignoring precisely the political and cultural considerations
highlighted herein. Still, in 2016/17, such is the dynamism and power
momentum of e-mobility innovation in China that low‑carbon transi-
tion in this domain is arguably emergent. This dynamism, though, is in
many respects in spite of, in the interstices of and even because of the
stasis, frustrations and disincentives of the official national plans for the
electric car as a power/knowledge relational assemblage.
Such illumination, however, elicits one final question, which re-
mains the obvious focus of future research: where could this dynamism
be leading regarding system transition; and what strategic openings and
challenges – again political and cultural, not just techno-economic –
present themselves as this new mobility system qualitatively shapes
future societies?
Preliminary responses to this further question, however, point pre-
cisely to ways in which the Chinese case, while in many respects un-
ique, suggests that in many places around the world – with both es-
tablished and/or burgeoning automobility systems – a power relational
perspective may be particularly insightful. First, the Chinese case
strongly suggests EV mass adoption depends on broader socio-technical
systems change and will not overtake the ICE car to the extent it is
imagined and pursued as a ‘car’ with an electric engine. Conversely, to
the extent this is grasped as strategic and power/knowledge relational
opportunity – a change in perspective more likely by outsiders to the
current automobility system and which involves reimagining political
power and cultural meanings of dominant mobility systems – it can be
readily conceived how this could be to EVs' longer-term advantage (and
possibly China's).
Moreover, in the context of broader research into sustainable smart
mobility, the Chinese case forces, and resonates with, a broader re-
framing of urban e-mobility, in which the EV features as one amongst
several mobility options; as a crucial part of urban mobility transition
(Low, 2013) that is self-consciously ‘new’ and attractive to the diverse
and novel demands for mobility, perhaps especially for Chinese
‘middle-class’ consumers. The ‘EV’-as-electric-‘car’ is thus not only a
dead-end – since ‘more cars means more city problems’ (Calthorpe
et al., 2012) even if they are electric – but also a barrier to the re-
imagining of ‘electric vehicles’ more generally, including by way of
development of small electric vehicles that could present considerable
new opportunities.
What the ‘EV’ is, in terms of novel assemblages of technologies
(batteries and charging standards, digitized used and access, real-time
traffic information and data analysis etc.…) but also social meaning and
‘common-sense’ forms of ownership, use and associated practices, re-
mains far from certain. In particular, while an imaginary of smart
mobility-as-a-service is increasingly taking shape, not least in China's
prospering megacities, it remains embryonic and, hence, far from set-
tled, with many essential contestations and uncertainties still to play
out. In other words, this analysis suggests that we do not yet even know
who the ‘EV’ is, as producer or user; and anywhere in the world, not just
in China. This is thus perhaps the most important, if neglected or pre-
sumed, question for future research.
This is a fundamentally political – as power/knowledge relational –
question. For instance, how the current Chinese regime, on the one
hand dependent for support from the rising middle classes, can, on the
other, accommodate their growing and more vocal demands for ‘live-
able urbanism’ and autonomous mobility remains a key question, and
for global mobility transitions, not just for Chinese politics; e.g. with air
quality and congestion central issues, as presuppositions of the in-
dividualized pursuit of ‘high quality’ urban lifestyles.
In short, the power relational perspective on mobility systems
transition opens the possibility that the dynamism and power mo-
mentum of innovation in China may be much more than just another
case study of a struggling EV niche. Instead it may be shaping a rising
China that may yet, in turn, dominate the construction of new form of
21st century urban mobility, just as a rising US did in the mid-20th
century (Tyfield, 2017; Cf Paterson, 2007). In these circumstances,
strategically illuminating this political and cultural process so as
maximally to expedite the urgently needed low‑carbon system transi-
tion while also optimizing public participation surely becomes all the
more important.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2017.09.006.
References
Nielsen, A.C., 2011. A Snapshot of Today's Car Buyers in China. www.cn.nielsen.com/
documents/Autoreport.pdf (8 June 2014).
Anagnost, A., 2004. The corporeal politics of quality (suzhi). Publ. Cult. 16, 189–208.
Atherton, A., Newman, A., 2017. Entrepreneurship in China: The Emergence of the
Private Sector. Routledge, London.
Avelino, F., Grin, J., 2016. Beyond deconstruction. A reconstructive perspective on sus-
tainability transition governance. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans (article in press).
Avelino, F., Rotmans, J., 2009. Power in transition. An interdisciplinary framework to
study power in relation to structural change. Eur. J. Social Theory 12 (4), 543–569.
Bidness etc., 2015. "Electric Vehicle Sales In China Are Booming; Tesla Amongst Gainers".
D. Tyfield, D. Zuev Technological Forecasting & Social Change 126 (2018) 259–270
268
June 16th, available at: https://bidnessetcnews.tumblr.com/post/121671862666/
electric-vehicle-sales-in-china-are-booming-tesla.
Bloomberg, 2015a. ‘China makes 100 billion yuan bet on electric vehicles’, Automotive
News China. available at: http://www.autonewschina.com/en/article.asp?id=
14169, Accessed date: 18 December 2015.
Bloomberg, 2015b. ‘Geely aims for EVs, hybrids to account for 90% of sales by 2020’,
Automotive News China. available at: http://www.autonewschina.com/en/article.
asp?id=14055, Accessed date: 18 December 2015.
Breznitz, D., Murphree, M., 2011. Run of the Red Queen. Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT.
Calthorpe, P., Yang, B., Zhang, Q., 2012. Transit Oriented Development in China - A
Manual of Land-use and Transportation for Low Carbon Cities. Calthorpe Associates,
Berkeley (CA).
Cherry, C., Yang, H., Jones, L.R., He, M., 2016. ‘Dynamics of electric bike ownership and
use in Kunming, China. Transp. Policy 45, 127–135.
Chong, M.P.M., Fu, P.P., Shang, Y.F., 2013. Relational power and influence strategies: a
step further in understanding power dynamics. Chin. Manag. Stud. 7 (1), 53–73.
Cohen, M., 2010. Destination unknown: pursuing sustainable mobility in the face of rival
societal aspirations. Res. Policy 39, 459–470.
Cohen, M., 2012. The future of automobile society: a socio-technical transitions per-
spective. Tech. Anal. Strat. Manag. 24 (4), 377–390.
Costa Maia, S., Teicher, H., Meyboom, A., 2015. Infrastructure as social catalyst: electric
vehicle station planning and deployment. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 100, 53–65.
Dean, M., 2010. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2nd edn. Sage,
London.
Dennis, K., Urry, J., 2009. After the Car. Polity, Cambridge.
Dunne, M.J., 2016. China aims to kill off most of its electric vehicle makers. Will it work?
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeldunne/2016/08/30/china-aims-to-kill-off-
most-of-its-electric-vehicle-makers-why-and-will-it-work/#372cc7d95208, Accessed
date: 1 October 2017.
Elzen, B., Geels, F.W., Leeuwis, C., van Mierlo, B., 2011. Normative contestation in
transitions ‘in the making’: Animal welfare concerns and system innovation in pig
husbandry. Res. Policy 40 (2), 263–275.
The Economist, 2016a. “The great crawl”, 18th June.
The Economist, 2016b. “It starts with a single app”, 1st October.
Fang, H., Zhu, Y., 2015. Development trend survey of low-speed EV. In Blue Book of New
Energy vehicle. In: Annual report on NEV industry in China.低速电动汽车行业发展形
势调查。中国新能源汽车产业发展报 告。Social Sciences Academic Press, pp.
239–256.
Flyvbjerg, B., 2004. Phronetic planning research: theoretical and methodological reflec-
tions. Planning Theory Practice 5 (3), 283–306.
Flyvbjerg, B., Landman, T., Schram, S., 2012. Real Social Science – Applied Phronesis.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Foucault, M., 2010. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979,
Translated by Graham Burchell. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Gao, P., Sha, S., Zipser, D., Baan, W., 2016. Finding the fast lane: emerging trends in
China's auto market. McKinsey report. April 2016. http://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/finding-the-fast-lane-emerging-
trends-in-chinas-auto-market Accessed January, 2017.
Geels, F., 2011. The multi-level perspective on sustainability transitions: responses to
seven criticisms. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 1, 24–40.
Geels, F., 2012. A socio-technical analysis of low-carbon transitions: introducing the
multi-level perspective into transport studies. J. Transp. Geogr. 24, 471–482.
Geels, F., 2014. ‘Regime resistance against low-carbon transitions: introducing politics
and power into the multi-level perspective. Theory Cult. Soc. 31 (5), 21–40.
Geels, F.W., Raven, R.P.J.M., 2007. Socio-cognitive evolution and co-evolution in com-
peting technical trajectories: biogas development in Denmark (1970–2002). Int J Sust
Dev World 14 (1), 63–77.
Geels, F., Verhees, 2011. Cultural legitimacy and framing struggles in innovation jour-
neys: a cultural-performative perspective and a case study of Dutch nuclear energy
(1945–1986). Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 78 (6), 910–930.
Genus, A., Coles, A.-M., 2008. Rethinking the multi-level perspective of technological
transitions. Res. Policy 37, 1436–1445.
Global Information, Inc, 2016. China EV Charging Station and Charging Pile Market
Report, 2016–2020. https://www.giiresearch.com/report/rinc351299-china-ev-
charging-station-charging-pile-market.html, Accessed date: 12 January 2017.
Goodman, D., 2015. Locating China’s middle classes: Social intermediaries and the party-
state. J. Contemp. China 25 (97), 1–13.
Grin, J., Rotmans, J., Schot, J., 2010. Transitions to Sustainable Development; New
Directions in the Study of Long Term Transformative Change. Routledge, New
York, NY.
Grin, J., Rotmans, J., Schot, J., 2011. On patterns of agency in transition dynamics: some
key insights from the KSI programme. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 1, 76–81.
Guo, Y., 2008. Farewell to class, except the middle class: The politics of class analysis in
contemporary China. Asia-Pacific Journal 26 (2), 1–19.
Heilmann, S., 2008. Policy experimentation in China's economic rise. Stud. Comp. Int.
Dev. 43 (1), 1–26.
Hess, D.J., 2014. Sustainability transitions: a political coalition perspective. Res. Policy
43, 278–283.
Huo, H., Zhang, Q., Wang, M.Q., Streets, D.G., He, K., 2010. Environmental implications
of electric vehicles in China. Environ. Sci. Technol. 44, 4856–4861.
Huang, Y., 2002. Between two coordination failures: automotive industrial policy in
China with a comparison to Korea. Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 9 (3), 538–573.
Huang, Y., 2009. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
International Energy Association (IEA), 2015. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion. IEA,
Paris.
iCET, 2011. Electric vehicles in the context of sustainable development in China. In: UN
Commission on Sustainable Development, Nineteenth Session, Background Paper 9,
2–13 May, New York.
Jakobson, L. (Ed.), 2007. Innovation With Chinese Characteristics. Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke.
Kahn, M., Zheng, S., 2016. Blue Skies Over Beijing. Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
Keith, M., Lash, S., Arnoldi, J., Rooker, T., 2013. China Constructing Capitalism:
Economic Life and Urban Change. Routledge, London.
Kemp, R., Loorbach, D., Rotmans, J., 2007. Transition management as a model for
managing processes of co-evolution towards sustainable development. Int. J. Sust.
Dev. World 14 (1), 78–91.
Kern, F., 2011. Ideas, institutions, and interests: explaining policy divergence in rostering
‘system innovations’ towards sustainability. Eviron. Plann. C. 29, 1116–1134.
Kern, F., Smith, A., Shaw, C., Raven, R., Verhees, B., 2014. From laggard to leader: ex-
plaining offshore wind developments in the UK. Energ Policy 69, 635–646.
Kirkegaard, J.K., 2016. In: Rapid upgrading through experiment (self-)disruptive impasse:
the case of China's wind turbine industry. Paper Presented to the International
Symposium on Innovation-Driven Development, Sun Yat Sen University, Guangzhou,
13th–15th June.
Li, Y., Zhan, C., de Jong, M., Lukszo, Z., 2016. Business innovation and government
regulation for the promotion of electric vehicle use: lessons from Shenzhen, China. J.
Clean. Prod. 134, 371–383.
Lin, J., Sun, X., 2010. Higher education expansion and China’s middle class. In: Cheng, Li
(Ed.), China's Emerging Middle Class. Brookings, Washington DC.
Lockwood, M., 2013. The political sustainability of climate policy: the case of the UK
Climate Change Act. Glob. Environ. Chang. 23 (5), 1339–1348.
Lohry, G.F., Yiu, A., 2015. Bikeshare in China as a public service: comparing government-
run and public-private partnership operation models. Nat. Res. Forum 39 (1), 41–52.
Low, N. (Ed.), 2013. Transforming Urban Transport. Earthscan, Abingdon &New York.
Lyons, G., Goodwin, P., 2014. Grow, peak or plateau – the outlook for car travel. In:
Report of a Roundtable Discussion, New Zealand Ministry of Transport.
Markard, J., Suter, M., Ingold, K., 2016. Socio-technical transitions and policy change –
advocacy coalitions in Swiss energy policy. Environ. Innov. Soc. Trans. 18, 215–237.
Marletto, G., 2014. Car and the city: socio-technical transition pathways to 2030.
Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 87, 164–178.
Masiero, G., Ogasavara, M.H., Jussani, A.C., Risso, M.L., 2016. Electric vehicles in China:
BYD strategies and government subsidies. Revista de Administraçao e Inovaçao 13,
3–11.
McMeekin, A., Southerton, D., 2012. Sustainability transitions and final consumption:
practices and sociotechnical systems. Tech. Anal. Strat. Manag. 24 (4), 345–361.
Meadowcroft, J., 2009. Engaging with the politics of sustainability transitions. Environ.
Innov. Soc. Trans. 1, 70–75.
Mertha, A., 2009. “Fragmented authoritarianism 2.0”: political pluralization in the
Chinese policy process. China Q. 200, 995–1012.
Muscat, S., 2015. New measures needed' to take China's cars off the roads. Chinadialogue.
19 January. Available at. https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/7664–New-
measures-needed-to-take-China-s-cars-off-the-roads/en, Accessed date: 29 January
2016.
Nolan, P., 2004. Transforming China: Globalization, Transition and Development.
Anthem, London.
Oi, J., 1992. Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in
China. World Politics 45 (1), 99–126.
OICA (International Organization of Motor Vehicles Manufacturers), 2013. 2013
Production Statistics. www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/ (12 January
2016).
Oudshoorn, N., Pinch, T. (Eds.), 2003. How Users Matter: The Co-construction of Users
and Technologies. MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
Pasaoglu, G., Fiorello, D., Martino, A., Zani, L., Zubaryeva, A., Thiel, C., 2014. Travel
patterns and the potential use of electric cars – results from a direct survey in six
European countries. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 87, 51–59.
Paterson, M., 2007. Automobile Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Personal Cars and China, 2003. The National Academies Press. Washington, DC.
Putnam, R., 1995. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
Simon and Schuster, New York.
Qin, L., 2015. ‘Cars the main culprit for Beijing's smog: govt figures’, Chinadialogue, 2nd
April. available at: https://www.chinadialogue.net/blog/7829-Cars-the-main-
culprit-for-Beijing-s-smog-govt-figures/en, Accessed date: 2 March 2016.
Reckwitz, A., 2002. Toward a theory of social practices: a development in culturalist
theorizing. Eur. J. Social Theory 5, 243–263.
Reuters, 2015a. ‘Drivers scope out EVs in smog-choked cities’, Automotive News China,
11th December. available at: http://www.autonewschina.com/en/article.asp?id=
14133, Accessed date: 18 December 2015.
Reuters, 2015b. ‘Hon Hai, Tencent partner in electric car business’, Reuters Technology
News, 23rd March. available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hon-hai-china-
idUSKBN0MJ0V320150323, Accessed date: 15 August 2017.
Rip, A., Kemp, R., 1998. Technological change. In: Rayner, S., Malone, E.L. (Eds.), Human
Choice and Climate Change. Batelle Press, Columbus, OH.
Rock, M., Murphy, J.T., Rasiah, R., van Seters, P., Managi, S., 2009. A hard slog, not a
leap frog: globalization and sustainability transitions in developing Asia. Technol.
Forecast. Soc. Chang. 76, 241–254.
Rotmans, J., Loorbach, D., 2010. Towards a better understanding of transitions and their
governance. A systemic and reflexive approach. In: Transitions to sustainable de-
velopment. New directions in the study of long term transformative change, pp.
105–198.
Sandow, E., 2011. On the road. Social aspects of commuting long distances to work (PhD
D. Tyfield, D. Zuev Technological Forecasting & Social Change 126 (2018) 259–270
269
dissertation). Umea University Press, Umea.
Schamp, E.W., 2014. The formation of a new technological trajectory of electric pro-
pulsion in the French automobile industry. In: DIE Discussion Paper. DIE, Bonn.
Schwanen, T., Banister, D., Anable, J., 2011. Scientific research about climate change
mitigation in transport: a critical review. Transp. Res. A 45, 993–1006.
Segal, A., 2010. Advantage: How American Innovation Can Overcome the Asian
Challenge. W.W. Norton, New York.
SHEVDC (2015) 上海新能源汽车市场特征与用户行为研究报告. 上海市新能源汽车公共数
据采集与监测研究中心:上海.
Shepard, W., 2016. Why Chinese cities are banning the biggest adoption of green trans-
portation in history. https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/05/18/as-
china-chokes-on-smog-the-biggest-adoption-of-green-transportation-in-history-is-
being-banned/#7f463abb141b, Accessed date: 18 December 2016.
Shove, E., 2003. Comfort Cleanliness and Convenience. The Social Organization of
Normality. Berg, Oxford, New York.
Shove, E., Walker, G., 2007. CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sus-
tainable transition management. Environ. Plan. A 39, 763–770.
Shove, E., Pantzar, M., Watson, M., 2012. The Dynamics of Social Practice. Sage, London.
Smith, A., Kern, F., Raven, R., Verhees, B., 2014. Spaces for sustainable innovation: solar
photovoltaic electricity in the UK. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 81, 115–130.
Smith, A., Raven, R., 2012. What is protective space? Reconsidering niches in transitions
to sustainability. Res. Policy 41, 1025–1036.
Smith, A., Stirling, A., 2008. Social-ecological resilience and socio-technical transitions:
critical issues for sustainability governance. In: STEPS Working Paper 8. STEPS
Centre, Brighton.
Smith, A., Voß, J.P., Grin, J., 2010. Innovation studies and sustainability transitions: the
allure of the multi-level perspective and its challenges. Res. Policy 39 (4), 435–448.
Spaargaren, G., 2003. Sustainable consumption: a theoretical and environmental policy
perspective. Soc. Nat. Resour. 16 (8), 687–701.
Teng, F., et al., 2015. Pathways to deep decarbonization in China. (SDSN - IDDRI).
Thun, E., 2006. Changing Lanes in China. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Tillemann, L., 2015. The Great Race: The Global Quest for the Car of the Future. Simon
and Schuster, New York.
Time, 2014. ‘China's Road Show’, 13th March.
Tse, E., 2016. China's Disruptors. Portfolio Penguin, London.
Tyfield, D., 2013. Low carbon transport and development. In: Urban, F., Nordensvard, J.
(Eds.), Low Carbon Development: Key Issues. Routledge, London.
Tyfield, D., 2014. Putting the power in ‘socio-technical regimes' – e-mobility transition in
China as political process. Mobilities 9 (4), 585–603.
Tyfield, D., 2017. Liberalism 2.0 and the Rise of China: Global Crisis, Innovation and
Urban Mobility. Routledge, London &New York.
Tyfield, D., Ely, A., Geall, A., 2015. Low carbon innovation in China: from overlooked
opportunities and challenges to transitions in power relations and practices. Sustain.
Dev. 23 (4), 206–216.
Tyfield, D., Zuev, D., 2016. Low-carbon mobility transitions in China. In: Hopkins, D.,
Higham, J. (Eds.), Low Carbon Mobility Transitions. Goodfellow, Oxford.
Unruh, G., 2000. ‘Escaping Carbon Lock-in’, Energy Policy. 30. pp. 317–325.
Urry, J., 2004. The “system” of automobilist. Theory Cult. Soc. 21 (4–5), 25–39.
Urry, J., 2013. Societies Beyond Oil: Oil Dregs and Social Futures. Zed Books, London.
Van Bree, B., Verbong, G.P.J., Kramer, G.J., 2010. A multi-level perspective on the in-
troduction of hydrogen and battery-electric vehicles. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang.
77 (4), 529–540.
Wang, J., 2008. Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Wang, T., 2013. Carnegie Policy Outlook: China's Electric Vehicle Policy. Carnegie
Institute, Beijing.
Wang, K.W., Lau, A., Fang, G., 2016. How savvy, social shoppers are transforming
Chinese e-commerce. In: McKinsey Report. April, . http://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/retail/our-insights/how-savvy-social-shoppers-are-transforming-chinese-
e-commerce, Accessed date: 10 December 2016.
Wells, P., Lin, X., 2015. Spontaneous emergence versus technology management in sus-
tainable mobility transitions: electric bicycles in China. Transp. Res. A Policy Pract.
78, 371–383.
Wilkinson, A., Kupers, R., Mangalagiu, D., 2013. How plausibility-based scenario prac-
tices are grappling with complexity to appreciate and address 21st century chal-
lenges. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 80, 699–710.
Winebrake, J., Rothenberg, S., Luo, J., Green, E., 2008. Automotive transportation in
China: Technology, policy, market dynamics, and sustainability. Int. J. Sustain. Dev.
Transp. 2, 213–238.
Wolf, I., Schröder, T., Neumann, J., de Haan, G., 2015. Changing minds about electric
cars: an empirically grounded agent-based modelling approach. Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Chang. 94, 269–285.
Wu, T., Ma, L., Ou, X., 2015. Setting up charging electric stations within residential
communities in current China: gaming of government agencies and property man-
agement companies. Energ Policy 77, 216–226.
Wu, X., Yang, X., Shi, H., 2015. Innovative practice of EV-carsharing in China for urban E-
mobility. Presentation at EVS28, Kintex, Korea, May 3–6, 2015. http://www.a3ps.at/
site/sites/default/files/downloads/evs28/papers/C1-01.pdf, Accessed date: 15
January 2016.
Yan, Y., 2010. The Chinese path to individualization. Br. J. Sociol. 61 (3), 489–512.
Yang, J., 2015a. ‘Beijing gives another boost to EVs by setting sales targets for each
province’, Automotive News China, 18th December. available at: http://www.
autonewschina.com/en/article.asp?id=14166, Accessed date: 18 December 2015.
Yang, J., 2015b. ‘How Beijing will nurture China's expanding EV industry’, Automotive
News China, 20th November. available at: http://www.autonewschina.com/en/
article.asp?id=14050, Accessed date: 18 December 2015.
Yang, J., 2016. ‘How Beijing's EV plan came unglued — and what to do about it’
Automotive News China, 28th January. available at: http://www.autonewschina.
com/en/article.asp?id=14050, Accessed date: 2 February 2016.
Yang, Y., Yang, Y., 2017. ‘China's booming bike-sharing sector beset by theft’ Financial
Tiimes, 26th June. available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1b0e3486-57c2-11e7-
9fed-c19e2700005f.
Yu, L., 2014. Consumption in China. Polity, Cambridge.
Zavoretti, R., 2013. “Be my Valentine”: Bouquets, marriage, and middle class hegemony
in urban China. In: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers 150,
. www.eth.mpg.de/cms/en/publications/working_papers/wp0150.html.
Zhao, Y., 2010. China's pursuits of indigenous innovations in information technology
developments: hopes, follies and uncertainties. Chin. J. Comput. Phys. 3 (3),
266–289.
Zhou, X., Qin, C., 2010. Globalization, social rransformation and the construction of
China’s middle class. In: Li, C. (Ed.), China’s Emerging Middle Class. Brookings,
Washington DC.
Zietsma, C., Lawrence, T.B., 2010. Institutional work in the transformation of an orga-
nizational field: the interplay of boundary work and practice work. Adm. Sci. Q. 55,
189–221.
Zipser, D., Gong, F., Wang, C., 2016. The Modernization of the Chinese Consumer. China
Customer Report, McKinsey & Company Available at. http://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/retail/our-insights/here-comes-the-modern-chinese-consumer, Accessed
date: 6 February 2017.
Zuev, D., Tyfield, D. and Urry, J. n.d. (forthcoming) Where is the politics? E-bike mobility
in urban China and civilizational government, Environ. Innov. Sustain. Transit.
David Tyfield is Reader in Environmental Innovation and Sociology at the Lancaster
Environment Centre, Lancaster University. He is Executive Director of the Joint Institute
for the Environment, Guangzhou and Co-Director of the Centre for Mobilities Research
(CeMoRe). His research focuses on the interaction of political economy, social change and
developments in science, technology and innovation, with a particular focus on issues of
low-carbon transition in China, especially urban e-mobility as well issues of food security
and ‘clean coal’. He was PI and lead researcher for a UK ESRC-funded project with col-
leagues at CeMoRe, Sussex, SOAS, Tsinghua and CAS on ‘Low Carbon Innovation in
China: Practice, Politics & Prospects’ (2013–17).
Dennis Zuev is at the Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology, CIES-ISCTE, Lisbon,
Portugal and Nürtingen-Geislingen University, Germany. Currently his research focuses
on social processes related to urban mobility in China and specifically on linkages be-
tween politics, everyday life and mobility practices. He is also interested in the underlying
politics of battery production and recycling as well as the implications of climate change
for the Arctic mobilities and circumpolar communities. He has done research on various
mobility practices in Russia, Portugal, Argentina and China. In 2010–2013 he was in-
volved in the Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology project “Conditions and
Limitations of Lifestyle Plurality” dedicated to the study of changing habits of traveling in
Siberia. He is a vice-president (research) of International Sociological Association
Working Group 03 “Visual Sociology”.
D. Tyfield, D. Zuev Technological Forecasting & Social Change 126 (2018) 259–270
270
